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SELECTING THE PRESIDENT:
A BAD IDEA OUT THERE IN CALIFORNIA
Robert W. Bennett ∗
California, like all states but two, chooses its electors in a single statewide winner-take-all contest. California has been reliably Democratic in
recent presidential elections, and the result is that neither major party candidate has seen fit to campaign in the state, despite the fact that, at fifty-five
electors, its delegation is the nation’s largest by some measure. Other
populous states with a decided political tilt, like Texas, New York and Illinois, are similarly given short shrift in presidential campaigning. The large
“swing” states like Florida, Pennsylvania, and Ohio get almost all of the
general election attention these days from major-party presidential candidates.
The campaign neglect has apparently rankled in California, and the
state has become the site of a great deal of reform effort. The most recent
proposal 1 would change California’s winner-take-all approach to the system
found in Maine and Nebraska, where all but two of the electors are determined by the popular vote in individual congressional districts. Maine’s and
Nebraska’s use of districting (since the 1972 and 1992 elections, respectively) attracts little attention because those states have small numbers of
electors (and, to boot, the districting has never yielded a split electoral college delegation in either state). A major claim on the website of the organization sponsoring the California move is that this would make the
presidential elections in the state more “democratic” by making the process
competitive. While the problem of competitiveness in California and other
non-swing states is real, the suggested cure in California—without similar
action by other states—is a terrible idea.
Most congressional districts in California, as elsewhere in the country,
have been produced by political gerrymandering and hence are themselves
characterized by a decided political tilt. At best, selecting electors in district elections would induce campaigning only in the small number of competitive congressional districts, not in the state as a whole. Even that
increase in campaigning would be quite modest, moreover, as small competitive winner-take-all states (New Hampshire, with four electoral votes,
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might be an example) would represent considerably bigger electoral college
prizes than any one California district. And the large swing states would
continue to represent far more attractive campaign grounds than California.
For this reason, it seems likely that the real motivation for the reform
effort is simply to move a good number of California’s electors from the
Democratic column to the Republican one. If the proposal were adopted,
the Republicans might hope to capture perhaps twenty of California’s fiftyfive electoral votes, instead of the present zero. Without similar reforms in
other large states, however, this would simply give the Republicans an edge
in the nation as a whole, rather than move presidential elections in a “democratic” (with a small “d”) direction. Thus, adoption in California alone
would have no particular effect in assuring that the nationwide popular vote
winner captures the presidency. And it would leave the competitive situation around the country essentially unchanged.
Partisan politics also explains why the measure is being proposed in
the form of a popular initiative rather than through legislation, which could
never get through the Democratically controlled California legislature. But
this raises another problem. The Constitution gives power to determine the
“manner” of choosing electors to the state “legislature,” 2 and the Supreme
Court has never considered whether the word “legislature” in the Constitution’s electoral college provisions might be construed to encompass direct
democratic decisionmaking. The Court has held that the same word in the
Article V’s amendment provisions does not allow for direct democratic decisionmaking, 3 but it has also suggested more leeway in another constitutional use of the same word. 4 Taking note of this problem in a recent
column in the New York Times, Bob Herbert warned that enactment of the
California districting proposal could invite the federal courts into the middle of yet another presidential election. 5
If competition for voters throughout the state of California were really
the goal, two different reforms would hold more promise. The easier of the
two to achieve would be awarding the state’s electors in proportion to the
statewide vote. This would give each of the two major party candidates
some incentive to campaign throughout the state, lest the opponent capture
an extra electoral vote or two. This too would essentially assure a split
electoral college delegation for California and hence aid Republicans, perhaps even more than districting. As with the proposed reform, however,
only a small number of electors would truly be in play in a proportionality
system, and if pursued by initiative, it would, of course, pose the same
question of the meaning of the word “legislature” as does the districting
proposal. But at least the focus of campaign attention in a proportionality
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state would be on state voters as a whole. A proportionality initiative went
down to defeat in Colorado in the 2004 election, but there seems no reason
why it should fare any less well in California than the current districting
proposal. 6
Even more effective in stimulating statewide competitiveness would be
getting on board the nascent effort to have the state’s electors awarded to
the winner of the nationwide popular vote (once states with a majority of
the electoral votes have signed on). 7 The effort faces a decidedly uphill battle, and to date it has succeeded only in Maryland. 8 But if the nationwide
vote were determinative, both major party candidates would have plenty of
incentive to campaign in the state as a whole, since California contains a lot
of potential voters for each of the major parties. And if adopted by states
with the required electoral college majority, candidates would have an incentive to campaign everywhere in the country where they thought votes
could be effectively harvested. A measure to join this nationwide vote
movement was passed by the California legislature, but was vetoed by
Governor Schwarzenegger last year. 9 Some diehard proponents of this proposal remain in the state, and seem prepared to keep trying.
To make the nationwide vote determinative through this route, however, requires a good number of other states to sign on. And many states
will be reluctant, because they would face the prospect that their electors
would go to a candidate who lost the popular vote in the state. The measure
would also raise difficulties in calculating the nationwide vote in a close
contest—or dealing with challenges to the count—since non-participating
states with a clear statewide winner would have little incentive to count the
vote in their states with great care, especially if the preliminary nationwide
totals seemed to favor the candidate who won in the state. 10
The present California effort teaches important lessons to the nation as
a whole. Electoral college decisionmaking is left largely in state hands, but
decisions made in one state—particularly the populous ones with large
chunks of electoral votes—can be very important in choosing the president
and hence have important implications for voters in other states. And the
universal embrace by the states of some form of popular election to choose
electors camouflages complications and technicalities in the process that require careful attention to reform proposals, particularly given the willing6
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ness demonstrated in the 2000 election of the United States Supreme Court
to enter the fray. Around the nation, the electoral college process is receiving long overdue attention. But this latest proposal in California alone is
not a step toward constructive reform.
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